We analyze how the cost-effectiveness of R&D influences the incentives for governments to impose export subsidies. Governments first impose an export subsidy, or a tax. After observing export policy, firms invest in cost reducing R&D and subsequently compete in the market. Governments subsidize exports under Cournot competition. Under Bertrand competition and for linear demands and constant marginal costs, export subsidies are positive whenever R&D is sufficiently cost-effective at reducing marginal costs, and negative otherwise. The trade policy reversal found in models without endogenous sunk costs disappears if R&D is sufficiently cost-effective. Thus, output subsidies seem more robust than implied by the recent literature.
Introduction
Since Eaton and Grossman (1986) , one of the major criticisms of the strategic trade literature has been its non-robustness to the mode of market competition. If trade policy is sensitive to the choice of strategic variable by firms and governments are uncertain about the mode of competition then strategic trade policy can be more harmful than beneficial. In this paper, we analyze export subsidies when firms invest in cost-reducing R&D before the market competition stage. We find that for sufficiently cost effective R&D 1 and under linear demand and constant marginal costs, governments subsidize exports independently of the mode of competition. This suggests that export subsidies are more robust to the type of the market competition than implied by the recent literature.
The robustness of strategic trade policy has been studied using two kinds of models. The first kind are two-stage games where a government first commits to output subsidies and then firms compete in the market. Using this approach Brander and Spencer (1985) show that the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under Cournot competition. Eaton and Grossman (1986) , however, show that the optimal strategic trade policy reverses to an export tax if firms compete in prices.
2 This policy reversal highlights the lack of robustness of strategic trade policy when governments are uncertain about the mode of competition.
In the second kind of models, actions are chosen in a three-stage game: governments first commit to a policy, firms then invest in R&D and later compete in the market. Investing in a strategic variable before the market competition stage captures entry barriers, a feature that is fundamental to oligopolistic markets (see Sutton, 1991) . A further appeal of these models is that they capture firm commitment to a strategic variable before the competition stage (Grossman, 1988) . If firms can make sunk investments -such as R&D-before the market competition stage then governments have two instruments at their disposal: output and R&D subsidies. If governments use only R&D policy Bagwell and Staiger (1994) show that governments subsidize R&D under both Cournot and Bertrand Competition.
3 Based on this, Brander (1995) suggests 1 We refer to the cost-effectiveness of R&D as its effect on marginal costs relative to the monetary cost of investing in R&D. 2 The reversal in the optimal export policy is explained by the fact that outputs are strategic substitutes and prices are strategic complements. See Brander (1995) for a discussion.
3 Spencer and Brander (1983) had shown the optimality of R&D subsidies under Cournot competition. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) develop a model where the effect of R&D invest-that R&D subsidies seem more robust than output subsidies. Neary and Leahy (2000) , however, dispute Brander's claim. 4 They show that when governments use two instruments (an output and a R&D subsidy at the same time) then both instruments are not robust to the nature of market competition. 5 This paper adds another argument against the claim that R&D subsidies are more robust than output subsidies. If governments only subsidize exports and firms invest in R&D (before competing in the market), we show that, under linear demand and costs, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, provided R&D is sufficiently cost-effective. This means that output policy is more robust than previously considered by the literature. This is true especially in industries where the marginal cost of R&D is not too high relative to its effect on process innovation.
The papers closest to ours are Spencer and Brander (1983) and Neary and Leahy (2000) . Spencer and Brander (1983) show that governments impose an output subsidy under Cournot competition when firms invest in R&D before competing in the market. They analyze two cases that are different from ours. First, they show the optimality of output subsidies if they are set by governments after firms decide their R&D investment. Second, they show that output subsidies are optimal if they are set jointly with R&D subsidies before R&D is chosen by firms. Neary and Leahy (2000) show that if governments only use output subsidies then the Eaton and Grossman trade policy reversal from Cournot to Bertrand competition is still observed when firms invest in R&D before the market competition stage 6 . We show that their result holds only when R&D is relatively ineffective at reducing marginal costs. Our result becomes clear once one realizes that the effect of R&D on profits depends on the level of output. Due to output expansion, an export subsidy increases the ability of domesment is stochastic. In the case where R&D reduces the mean but does not affect the variance of costs (the closest case to deterministic R&D), they find that R&D should be subsidized under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Maggi (1996) finds a similar result in a model where firms invest in capacities (instead of R&D) before the competition stage. The optimal policy in his model is to subsidize capacities. 4 See Neary and Leahy (2000) , page 505. 5 Neary and Leahy (2000) show that under Cournot competition governments subsidize exports and tax R&D, a result found in Spencer and Brander (1983) . However, under Bertrand competition, governments will tax exports and subsidize R&D. The intuition is that governments use export policy to shift profits from foreign firms (as in models without R&D) and use R&D policy to correct the distortion on R&D generated by the strategic behavior of firms. Therefore, if governments use two instruments, strategic policy in the presence of R&D is no longer robust to changes in the mode of competition.
6 Neary and Leahy (2000) show this result in a numerical simulation. We compare our result with theirs and discuss why they obtain a reversal in Section 4 of this paper. tic R&D to shift profits from the foreign firm. Output expansion, due to the output subsidy, occurs under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Therefore, just looking at the effect through R&D, governments have the incentive to subsidize exports both under price and quantity competition.
The sign of the optimal policy depends upon the net effect of the export subsidy on the R&D and the market competition stage. In a model without R&D, the sign of the strategic trade policy depends on the strategic complementarity or substitutability of the variables chosen by firms in the market competition stage. Under R&D and Cournot competition, a unilateral export subsidy increases welfare both through its effect on R&D and on output. This means that governments want to subsidize exports (Spencer and Brander, 1983 ). Under Bertrand competition, however, the two effects have the opposite sign. If R&D is sufficiently cost effective then R&D will be relatively elastic with respect to an export subsidy. This high elasticity of R&D will make the effect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage stronger than the effect on the price competition stage. In this case, governments subsidize output under Bertrand competition. Conversely, if R&D is not sufficiently cost-effective then the effect of an output subsidy on the price competition stage dominates the effect on the R&D stage and the optimal policy under Bertrand competition is an output tax.
We use the standard third country model (Spencer and Brander (1983) ). Two firms, each located in a country, produce a differentiated good that is exported to a third country. There is no domestic consumption and welfare is measured as producer surplus (profits) net of subsidy costs. 7 In a three stage game of complete information, the domestic government first sets an output subsidy s 1 . This is followed by both firms simultaneously deciding their investment in cost-reducing R&D (∆ i and ∆ j ). In the third stage, firms compete in the product market simultaneously choosing quantities, 8 or prices. We assume that governments commit to an export subsidy while firms commit to their investment in R&D.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes output subsidies under Bertrand competition in the last stage. Section 3 presents a numerical simulation that highlights the effect of the convexity of the cost of R&D on the optimal trade policy. Section 4 concludes.
Bertrand Competition
We show that if a government chooses an export subsidy before 9 the R&D stage then the optimal policy is an export subsidy if R&D is sufficiently cost effective. If R&D is not sufficiently cost effective then the optimal policy is a tax. In the first stage of the game, a government chooses an export subsidy s 1 . Following this, firms choose R&D investment. Prices are chosen in the third stage of the game. R&D investment generates a process innovation of size ∆ i (by firm i) with a cost of φ(∆ i ) to the firm. The monetary cost is increasing and convex in the extent of process innovation and reduces total and marginal costs of production. We assume that goods are imperfect substitutes and that the own-price effect dominates the cross-price effect. Denoting firms by superscripts and derivatives by subscripts these assumptions translate into,
Revenues areR
Revenues are assumed to satisfy the following properties:
Assumption (2) states that revenue is concave in its own price, a property which is satisfied by demand functions that are not too convex. Assumption (3) is the standard case where revenue is increasing, at a non-decreasing rate, in other firm's price. Lastly, (4) states that an increase in the price of a good increases marginal revenue for the other firm. All these assumptions are satisfied, for example, by linear demands.
We make the following assumptions about costs:
The profit function of firm 1 and firm 2 can now be written as:
The net domestic benefit of country 1 is simply the profit of the domestic firm minus the cost of the subsidy:
Last Stage: Price Competition
In the first stage, firms maximizeΠ
, choosing price p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The first order conditions then are:
with the second order conditions:
We assume that the second order conditions are satisfied. For later use we need to assume that the own effect of output on marginal profits is stronger (bigger in absolute value) than the cross effect, that is¯Π
Note that assumptions (4) and (6) imply that the cross-partial derivative of profits is positive (Π i ij > 0) for country 2. This is also the case for country 1 as long as
∂p i ∂p j is not too big (as in the case of linear demand), which we assume. Prices are then strategic complements and price reaction functions are positively sloped. That is, along a price reaction function, dp i dp j = −Π i ij
This is a standard result for Bertrand games with differentiated products. The solution to the two equations (7) and (8) gives us prices as a function of the R&D levels of both firms (chosen in the previous stage) and output subsidy
To see the effect of R&D investment and subsidies on prices, we differentiate the two first order conditions given in (7) and (8). We obtain
where the inequalities come from (4), (5), (6) and (9). The expressions above state that prices are decreasing both in domestic and foreign R&D. An increase 10 Note that, for linear demands,
ij are the same as in the case of free trade since
in R&D expenditure reduces the marginal cost of production, shifting the reaction curve of firm i downwards. Given that prices are strategic complements, this implies that both firms, i and j, charge a lower price. Given that output subsidy is chosen before firms decide on their R&D, the effect of the subsidy on prices has to take into account how it affects the choice of R&D by both firms. The partial effects, keeping R&D levels (∆ 1 and ∆ 2 ) constant, are:ψ
Notice that we assume that R&D levels are kept constant, while in fact they are influenced by the choice of output subsidies. The total effect of a change in s 1 , therefore, has to also take this into account. 11 In order to obtain the effect of imposing an output subsidy (before R&D takes place), we turn now to the R&D stage.
Second stage: R&D investment
Rewrite the profit of the firm as a function of R&D and output subsidies:
The first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in the choice of R&D are,
11 Expressions forψ (14) and (15)) would be relevant if output subsidies are chosen after R&D levels are set.
with second order conditions:
Notice that (4), (12) and (13)) andd
is hard to sign. However, in the case of linear demand it is equal toĈ = 0. Assuming also that marginal costs are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D (i.e.
ii . This expression can only be negative (for (18) 
ii is big enough. This is equivalent to saying that as R&D increases, its cost-effectiveness has to decline fast enough, a condition similar to the one under Cournot competition.
Assuming that the own effect of R&D on marginal profits is stronger (bigger in absolute value) than the cross effect, that is,π
The cross partial derivativeπ i ∆ i ∆ j is, in general, difficult to sign. However, the following proposition establishes that, for the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs, R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes when firms compete in prices.
Proposition 1 Under Bertrand competition, R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes for linear demands and constant marginal costs:
Proof. See Appendix. Proposition 1 states that an increase in R&D by firm 2 reduces the marginal profitability of R&D by firm 1. To see how this occurs, notice that firm 1 sets its R&D, ∆ 1 , to satisfy (16). An infinitesimal increase in ∆ 1 has two opposing effects on firm 1's profits. First, profits increase due to the reduction in total costsĈ 1 . On the other hand a reduction in p 2 (due to increased R&D, ∆ 1 ) decreases firm revenues. 12 The first order condition (16) shows this trade off against the increase in the cost of R&D , φ 1 1 (∆ 1 ). Consider now an infinitesimal increase in R&D by firm 2. This reduces both p 1 and p 2 . However, the fall in own price (p 2 ) is greater than the price decline for the rival.
13 A bigger price increase for firm 1 means that it now sells less. Lower output reduces the effectiveness of ∆ 1 in reducing total costs for firm 1. This is captured by the last two terms of (20). The first term captures the effect of an increase in ∆ 2 on the marginal effect of ∆ 1 on firm 1's revenue. The fall in quantity (x 1 ), associated with an increase in ∆ 2 , makes the revenue loss of an increase in ∆ 1 less important. This accounts forψ
Note that the (direct) effect on costs dominates the (indirect) effect on revenue (see proof of proposition 1). The positive effect of investing in R&D for firm 1 weakens due to an increase in ∆ 2 . Since the marginal cost of R&D φ 1 1 (∆ 1 ) is unaffected by a change in ∆ 2 , an increase in foreign R&D (∆ 2 ) makes own R&D less attractive. Therefore, firm 1 optimally invests less in R&D in response to an increase in ∆ 1 , implying thatπ i ∆ i ∆ j < 0. A corollary of the previous proposition is that the slope of firm i's R&D reaction function is negative. R&D reaction functions are negatively sloped (i.e. strategic substitutes) both under Cournot and Bertrand competition because the main effect of R&D comes through total costs. In both cases an increase in R&D by firm 2 reduces firm 1's output thereby decreasing the capacity of ∆ 1 to reduce firm 1's total costs. Under Cournot competition, the effect on marginal revenue adds to this effect on costs. With Bertrand competition, the effect on marginal revenue dampens (but does not dominate) the effect on costs (as shown in proposition 1). The next section describes the effect of output subsidies on R&D and price choices.
12 From the envelope theorem we can ignore the effect on firm 1's price on its profits. 13 This can be easily seen comparingψ (12) and (13), and recalling that own effects dominate cross effects in the price stage.
First stage: Output Subsidies
In order to see the effect of output subsidies on R&D investment, we totally differentiate the two first order conditions given by (16) and (17). As no clearcut solutions exist when we depart from the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs we continue to assume this case. The next proposition describes the effect of an output subsidy on equilibrium R&D for linear demands and constant marginal costs.
Proposition 2 Under Bertrand competition, an output subsidy by the domestic government increases R&D of the domestic firm, and reduces R&D of the foreign firm:
Proof. See appendix The intuition for this proposition is straightforward once we understand how R&D influences profits. Recall (from the discussion of proposition 1) that the incentives to invest in R&D decrease if output declines: the beneficial effects of cost reduction are smaller if output is lower. Consider now an increase in the output subsidy s 1 . The output subsidy results in a reduction in the price of both goods. However, p 1 declines by a greater amount than p 2 . As a result, output of firm 1 increases while output of firm 2 decreases. The output expansion creates an even greater incentive for firm 1 to invest in R&D (shifts its R&D reaction function out). The effect on firm 2 is just the contrary: the incentives for firm 2 to invest in R&D decline (firm 2's R&D reaction function shifts in) due to the output subsidy, s 1 . The same type of effect is observed under Cournot competition. An increase in the output subsidy increases quantity produced. This positively affects the incentives to invest in R&D for the home firm. In both cases the foreign firm reduces its R&D due to decreased foreign production. As one would expect, an output subsidy imposed by the domestic government affects domestic R&D more than foreign R&D. This result, formalized in the next corollary, is used later to determine the sign of the optimal output subsidy.
Corollary 3 Under Bertrand competition, the effect of an output subsidy on own R&D expenditures is stronger than on foreign R&D expenditures:¯d Proof. See appendix Similar to quantity competition, an increase in output subsidy (s 1 ) shifts the R&D reaction function of firm 1 out and that of firm 2 in (left half of figure  1 ). This means that the equilibrium in R&D space moves from B (free trade) to S. For a small output subsidy, this leaves firm 1 inside its iso-profit contour (π 1 ) (that passes through the free trade point B): looking at the R&D stage an output subsidy increases welfare for the domestic country. However, as under Cournot, we have to also take into account the effect of the subsidy in the price competition stage. This is illustrated in the right half of figure 1. Similar to Cournot competition, an output subsidy increases domestic (and reduces foreign) R&D. This decreases domestic marginal costs beyond the direct effect of the subsidy, and increases foreign marginal costs. Thus, the domestic price reaction function shifts in and the foreign price reaction function shifts out. This moves the equilibrium from B to S. From corollary 3 we know that even if we only take into account the effect of R&D on the price stage, the reaction function of firm 1 will shift more that the reaction function of firm 2. This leaves point S outside the iso-profit contour π 1 , passing through point B in the price space. Therefore an output subsidy reduces welfare for the home government in the price stage. The net effect on the two stages determines whether an output subsidy increases, or reduces, welfare.
Formally, define the net domestic benefit of government 1 asB which can be rewritten as (see appendix):
where
is the gross benefit per unit sold, including the output subsidy. Note that the terms dψ i ds 1 capture the total effect of the output subsidy on prices. They take into account that the subsidy also affects the choice of R&D by both firms in the second stage (and this, in turn, affects prices).
The first term on the right hand side of (21) shows the effect of the output subsidy on domestic benefit in the second stage (R&D investment). A domestic output subsidy reduces foreign R&D investment ³ d∆ 2 ds 1 < 0´, which in turn increases the foreign price p 2 . The increase in p 2 increases domestic output x 1 and hence firm 1's profits. Notice that due to the envelope theorem, the effect of an infinitesimal increase in the subsidy s 1 on domestic benefitB 1 (through domestic R&D) can be ignored.
The second term in (21) captures the effect of an output subsidy on domestic benefit in the third stage (price competition stage). A domestic output subsidy reduces the foreign price in the price competition stage (ψ 2 s 1 < 0). The reduction in the foreign price p 2 reduces domestic output and profits. Again, the envelope theorem allows us to ignore the effect of the output subsidy on domestic benefits through the domestic price p 
The third term in (21) captures the increase in the subsidy expenditures due to an increase in domestic output. It includes the direct effect of the subsidy in the price competition stage, as well as the R&D stage effect and price stage effect. To obtain the expression for the optimal output subsidy we need to solve, ∂B
with the second order condition
Solving (22), the precise expression for the optimal output subsidy is obtained:
where, m 1 = p 1 − and thus the sign of the optimal subsidy depends on whether the effect on the R&D stage, or on the price stage, dominates in the numerator of (24). Define,
∂∆ i ∂x i , as the effectiveness of R&D at reducing marginal costs of production. As we will see, the sign of the optimal output subsidy is ambiguous and depends on the cost of R&D (φ is the only term in the numerator of (24) that depends on φ 1 11 . The following lemma helps us in understanding the role of the cost of R&D on the elasticity of R&D to output subsidies.
Lemma 4
The influence of output subsidies on R&D decreases as the marginal cost of R&D increases. Specifically,
Proof. See Appendix An increase in φ 1 11 makes R&D investment more convex. As a result, R&D is less elastic to an output subsidy, and therefore the R&D stage effect of an 14 See the proof of proposition 5. output subsidy in (24) is weaker. Whenever the R&D stage effect is weak, the optimal output subsidy is influenced more by the price stage effect and should be optimally set below zero (an output tax).
The domestic government only takes into account the effect of an output subsidy on price competition when the effect of an output subsidy on foreign R&D is smaller (φ 1 11 becomes higher). Contrarily, the government only takes into account the effect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage when φ 1 11 is small enough. The following proposition formalizes this result, showing that we could have an output subsidy or a tax depending on the convexity of the cost of investment in R&D, i.e. φ i 11 .
15
Proposition 5 Under Bertrand competition, the convexity of the cost of R&D (φ i 11 ) determines the sign of the optimal subsidy, s 1 * . The optimal output subsidy is positive when the cost of additional investment in R&D (φ i 11 ) is sufficiently low, and negative (an output tax) when φ i 11 is sufficiently high. Specifically,
Proof. See Appendix As φ i 11 increases, the cost of investing in R&D becomes more convex. A steeper R&D cost function makes R&D less elastic with respect to an output subsidy. This reduces the effect of the subsidy on the foreign firm's R&D reaction function, leaving the effect on the foreign firm price reaction function unaffected. This implies that the domestic government has an incentive to reduce the output subsidy, or even tax output, as in the standard Bertrand game without R&D investment.
The following section numerically highlights the results of price competition when the degree of product differentiation and the degree cost effectiveness are varied. We also comment on why Neary and Leahy (2000) obtain a reversal in a structure similar to ours. 15 Notice, however, that φ i 11 is bounded below by the stability condition (19) and therefore cannot take values below θπ
. See the proof of lemma 4. 
A Numerical Example

16
We consider linear demands and constant marginal costs with respect to output 17 . In particular, assume that the inverse demand for good i is given by:
With 0 < γ < 1. Cost functions are linear in output,
and the monetary cost of ∆ i units of R&D is quadratic:
The second order condition of the government's maximization problem (23) has to be satisfied. As expected, the optimal subsidy depends on the cost-effectiveness of R&D (η) and the degree of product differentiation (γ). Given γ, figure 2 shows that the optimal output subsidy is increasing in η (i.e. decreasing in φ i 11 ). As the R&D effect becomes stronger (η increases) the 16 The numerical simulation for quantity competition is available in Kujal and Ruiz (2007) . 17 The mathematica code used to generate the numerical results is available from the authors upon request. 
Total profits firm 1 π 18 Further note that the degree of product differentiation is important in determining the sign of the optimal policy. The slope of the curve in figure 2 increases with higher γ (less product differentiation) in such a way that it increases the range of values of η for which the export subsidy is positive under price competition. Table 1 presents numerical results for γ = 0.5 and two different values of 18 Under price competition (figure 2) the stability condition (19) translates into,
For γ = 0.5, we require η < 1.33929 to satisfy this condition.
η (0.3 and 0.7). Notice that all relevant quantities are positive and that the second order condition for the government's maximization problem is satisfied. Table 1 shows that, depending on the cost-effectiveness of R&D (η), there could be a policy reversal under Bertrand competition.
Comparing our results to the numerical simulations presented in section 3 of Neary and Leahy (2000) we see why they obtain the policy reversal under Bertrand competition. They assume (for the Cournot case) a set of parameters which, with our notation, imply b = γ = θ = a − c = 1 and η = 1 φ = 0.2. For these parameter values we obtain an optimal subsidy s 1 * = 0.3089, which roughly corresponds to what they refer to as the second-best optimal output subsidy. This is represented by the intersection of the flatter line with the vertical axis in their figure 3.
Under Bertrand competition their parameters are b = θ = a − c = 1 and η = 1 φ = 0.4, with inverse demand,
. This implies that cross price effects are as strong as own price effects. Due to this, our results cannot be directly compared with theirs. They find that the optimal output subsidy is negative (point C in their figure 4). If we set γ = 0.5, and use their parameters, we obtain a negative output subsidy (i.e. a tax) equal to s 1 * = −0.0224. We only need to have a cost-effectiveness of R&D beyond 0.6 to obtain a positive output subsidy (as shown in figure 2 ) under price competition.
Conclusions
This paper shows that for sufficiently cost effective R&D the trade policy reversal in Eaton and Grossman (1986) is not observed. Our result suggests that output subsidies are more robust than otherwise implied if one takes into account investment in long run variables such as R&D. If exporting industries make long run investments before competing in the market then governments have a case for using output subsidies even if they are uncertain about the mode of competition in the market. Though, R&D has to be sufficiently effective for this to be true.
We show that a necessary condition for output subsidies to be robust is that R&D be sufficiently cost effective. If the cost of R&D is too convex then R&D expenditures will be relatively inelastic to the export subsidy. In this case, the effect of an export subsidy on R&D will be negligible and will thus be arbitrarily close to the case when there is no R&D investment (Brander and Spencer (1985) , Eaton and Grossman (1986) ). If R&D costs are not too convex then R&D is responsive to an output subsidy. In this case, the effect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage reinforces the effect of the output subsidy on the market competition stage under Cournot competition, and dominates it under Bertrand competition. Thus, regardless of the mode of competition, the optimal policy is an output subsidy if R&D is sufficiently cost-effective.
Our condition on the curvature of the cost of R&D is reminiscent of Maggi (1996) . In his model, firms invest in capacity and then compete in prices in the product market. Maggi shows that going from Cournot to Bertrand competition the optimal policy changes from an output subsidy to a tax. The key parameter is his model is the convexity of the cost function. A more convex cost function (i.e. steeper marginal cost) results in firm behavior closer to price competition. The optimal trade policy in this case is an output tax. Contrarily, a flatter marginal cost implies that the optimal policy is an output subsidy. In contrast to Maggi (1996) , in our model marginal costs are constant. Under Bertrand competition, whether the optimal policy is an output subsidy or a tax, depends on the convexity of the cost of R&D . Under Cournot competition, the optimal trade policy is always an output subsidy.
A Proof of Proposition 1.
Note that,
Here,
and (13)) and
Both the second order condition (18) and the stability condition (19) impose bounds on φ i ii (this is discussed in the determination of the optimal subsidy). Note that, under the assumption that marginal costs are constant, we havē ψ j ∆ i ∆ j = 0. If demand is linear thenR i jj = 0 and the slope of the demand function is not influenced by R&D. Formally:
Linearity of demand and constant marginal costs together implŷ
T hen, we can simplify both expressionsπ
Recall that, for linear demands,Π 
is between zero and one andΠ i ii < 0. Notice that γ measures the degree of product differentiation and is bounded between 0 (independent goods) and 1 (perfect substitutes).
B Proof of Proposition 2
For later use we need to computeψ
Note thatψ i ∆ i ∆ j is zero for constant marginal costs with respect to output and ψ i ∆ j ∆ j is zero for marginal costs that are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D.
For the first part of the proof, we start by differentiating totally the two first order conditions given by (16) and (17). Using Cramer's rule:
To obtain the value of expressions in (26) we need to obtain the total effect of subsidies on marginal revenues (including the effect on the price competition stage). We have
The inequalities are obtained using (3), (4), (12), (13), (14) and (15).
Turn next to the total effect of R&D on marginal costs:
where the inequalities are derived from (5), (6), (12), (13), (14) and (15). We also assume linear demand and constant marginal cost with respect to output (so thatĈ Using these inequalities we can now turn to the elements of (26). We will use the fact that, for linear demands,Π 
∂p j¯, and that assumption (1) means¯Ĉ
where γ = − ∂x i ∂p j ∂x i ∂p i measures the degree of product differentiation as in the proof of proposition 1. We also have
The second order condition (18) means thatπ i ∆ i ∆ i < 0, whereas the stabil-ity condition (19) implies
. Also, from proposition 1:
All these imply:
and d∆
Which is the statement of the proposition.
From (27), (28), (29) and (30) we can also derive the following relationships, to be used later:π 
where the inequality comes from the denominator being negative ( (18) D Derivation of equation (21) Recall that from the first order condition in the R&D stage,π where m 1 ≡ p 1 − ∂C 1 ∂x 1 + s 1 . The last two expressions capture the total effect of the output subsidy on prices. They take into account that the subsidy also affects the choice of R&D by both firms in the second stage (and these, in turn, affect prices). This effect (through R&D) is reflected in the first two terms of the expression.
With these expressions we can rewrite 
E Proof of Lemma 4
Before proving the statement of the lemma, we need to derive the restrictions on φ i 11 implied by the second order condition (18) and the stability condition (19).
From the definition ofπ 
